AI Agent Governance & Assurance | T3
Agentic AI

An Agent Is a Loop With Your Permissions.

Agents plan, call tools, observe results and plan again. Every pass through that loop is a decision your controls either bound or do not. T3 finds where in the loop your controls actually attach, tests whether they hold, and builds the ones that are missing.

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ISO 42001

Aligned agent controls, embedded into delivery

EU AI Act

Human oversight obligations met at the action layer

2/3

Of BigTech trust T3 with AI risk management

Independent

No commercial ties to the agent platforms we test

Where controls attach

The Loop, the Graph, and the Control Plane

Most AI governance was written for a request and a response. An agent is neither. It is a loop that runs until it decides it is finished, and a graph of tool calls and handoffs that only exists at runtime. Controls that sit outside that loop do not constrain it.

The agent loop with four control points A cycle of Perceive, Plan, Act and Observe, with control points attached at each stage: context integrity, policy and least agency, scoped credentials and action gating, and trace logging and evaluation. 1. Perceive reads untrusted content Context integrity injection and memory poisoning defence 2. Plan selects the next tool Least agency policy on which tools may be reached at all 3. Act changes real state Scoped credentials 4. Observe feeds result back in Traces, spans, evals THE AGENT LOOP runs until the agent decides it is done
The loop

Four Stages, Four Different Controls

Perceive, plan, act, observe. Each stage fails differently, so each needs a different control. A single approval gate placed at the end catches almost none of it.

  • Perceive: context integrity and provenance
  • Plan: least agency and tool allow-lists
  • Act: scoped credentials and gating
  • Observe: trace capture and evaluation
The graph

The Execution Path Only Exists at Runtime

An agent's actual path through tools, sub-agents and handoffs is a graph assembled on the fly. You cannot review a diagram drawn in advance, because the diagram is generated by the run.

  • Delegation chains and sub-agent handoffs
  • Tool call graphs, including MCP servers
  • Replayable execution traces
The control plane

Controls Belong Beside the Agent, Not Around It

Policy in a document does not intercept a tool call. Controls have to sit in the execution path itself, where they can deny, gate or halt an action before it lands.

  • Deterministic guardrails at the tool boundary
  • Circuit breakers and blast radius limits
  • Kill switch that actually reaches the runtime
The core challenge

An Agent Is Not a Chatbot With Extra Steps

Every control you built for generative AI assumed a human read the output before anything happened. Agents close that gap. The failure modes below are specific to systems that act, and most governance frameworks do not address any of them.

Borrowed Identity, Full Authority

An agent running on a user's credentials inherits everything that user can reach. Least privilege designed for humans does not constrain a non-human actor operating at machine speed across a delegation chain.

Indirect Prompt Injection and Memory Poisoning

Agents read pages, tickets, documents and tool responses. Any of those can carry instructions the model treats as legitimate. Persistent memory makes it worse, because a single poisoned entry survives into every future run.

No Trace, No Reconstruction

Chat transcripts capture the conversation, not the spans: tool calls, arguments, records touched, sub-agents invoked. Without trace-level logging you cannot replay what happened, which means you cannot evidence it either.

Oversight That Degrades Into a Click

An approval a person confirms fifty times a day stops being oversight by the tenth. Human-in-the-loop has to be reserved for irreversible actions, with everything else moved to human-on-the-loop monitoring.

Miniature construction workers operating inside a computer keyboard while a human hand rests above the keys, illustrating AI agents acting autonomously within enterprise systems
Agents work inside your systems, at their own pace, while the hand above them approves in aggregate rather than action by action.
The hardest question about an AI agent is not whether it works. It is whether you can explain, afterwards, exactly what it did and why it was allowed to. T3 — AI Agent Assurance Practice
Definition

What Is AI Agent Assurance?

AI agent assurance is the discipline of bounding, testing and evidencing what an autonomous AI system is permitted to do, at the point in its execution loop where each action is actually taken.

It spans the non-human identity the agent holds, the least agency policy that decides which tools it may reach, the deterministic guardrails at the tool boundary, the adversarial testing that proves those guardrails hold, the trace and span logging that makes a run replayable, and the evaluation harness that catches behavioural drift between model versions.

It begins where AI governance stops being a documentation exercise and becomes an engineering one, aligned to human oversight obligations under the EU AI Act and the operational controls of ISO/IEC 42001.

ISO/IEC 42001 Aligned EU AI Act Compliant Adversarially Tested Trace-Level Evidence
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Our framework

The Six Pillars of AI Agent Assurance

T3's framework attaches a control to every layer at which an autonomous system can fail, from the identity it holds to the trace it leaves behind.

Pillar 01

Agent Inventory & Blast Radius Mapping

Establish which agents exist, which tools and MCP servers they can reach, and how far a wrong action propagates. Shadow agents are counted, not assumed away.

  • Agent register and ownership mapping
  • Tool, connector and MCP server inventory
  • Blast radius and reversibility scoring
Pillar 02

Non-Human Identity & Least Agency

Give the agent its own identity with its own scoped credentials, rather than letting it borrow a user's full authority. Least agency extends least privilege to what the agent may attempt, not only what it may read.

  • Agent identity and scoped credential design
  • Tool allow-lists and capability boundaries
  • Delegation chain and handoff constraints
Pillar 03

Deterministic Guardrails at the Tool Boundary

Probabilistic systems need deterministic limits. Guardrails sit in the execution path and can deny, gate or halt a call before it changes state.

  • Deny rules and irreversible action gating
  • Input, output and tool argument validation
  • Circuit breakers and runtime kill switch
Pillar 04

Adversarial Testing of the Loop

Prove the guardrails hold under attack at every stage of the cycle: injection at perceive, tool misuse at plan, privilege escalation at act, poisoned feedback at observe.

  • Indirect prompt injection and memory poisoning
  • Tool abuse and chained escalation testing
  • Reproduction steps with severity ratings
Pillar 05

Human Oversight Calibrated to Consequence

In the loop for irreversible actions, on the loop for everything else. Oversight placed uniformly is oversight nobody performs.

  • Consequence-based approval thresholds
  • Escalation and intervention protocols
  • Oversight effectiveness review
Pillar 06

Observability, Evals & Replay

Trace-level capture of every span, paired with an evaluation harness that detects behavioural drift when a model, prompt or tool changes underneath you.

  • Span and tool call logging specification
  • Regression evals across model versions
  • Incident replay and surveillance integration
Plain terms

The Vocabulary, Without the Hype

These terms turn up in every agent conversation and are rarely defined the same way twice. Here is what we mean by them.

Least agency

Least privilege extended from what a system may read to what it may attempt. The narrowest set of tools that still completes the task.

Blast radius

How far a single wrong action propagates before something stops it. The measure that should drive where you place approval.

Trace and span

A trace is one complete agent run. A span is one step inside it: a tool call, its arguments, its result. Evidence lives at span level.

Deterministic guardrail

A rule enforced in code rather than requested in a prompt. The model can be persuaded. The guardrail cannot.

Human in the loop vs on the loop

In the loop means the action waits for approval. On the loop means it proceeds and a human monitors. Consequence decides which applies.

Indirect prompt injection

Instructions arriving through content the agent reads rather than the user's message. The primary attack path against any tool-using system.

Engagement model

T3's AI Agent Assurance Process

A phase-gated engagement designed for organisations deploying agents into environments where a wrong action carries regulatory or client consequence.

Phase 01Weeks 1 to 2

Agent Discovery & Blast Radius Mapping

Establish which agents are live or planned, which tools, connectors and MCP servers they reach, and how far a wrong action travels. Includes agents adopted without central approval.

OutputsAgent Register · Tool and Connector Map · Blast Radius Scoring
Phase 02Weeks 3 to 6

Identity, Guardrail & Trace Design

Design the non-human identity model, least agency policy, deterministic guardrails at the tool boundary, approval thresholds and span-level logging specification. Written to be implementable by your engineers, not aspirational policy.

OutputsIdentity Model · Guardrail Specification · Oversight Design · Trace Logging Standard
Phase 03Weeks 7 to 10

Adversarial Testing & Remediation

Test the controls as an attacker would, at every stage of the loop. Indirect prompt injection and memory poisoning at perceive, tool misuse at plan, privilege escalation across delegation chains at act. Findings are rated and re-tested after remediation.

OutputsFindings Report · Reproduction Steps · Remediation Plan · Re-test Certificate
Phase 04Ongoing

Evals, Monitoring & Continuous Assurance

Stand up the evaluation harness that catches behavioural drift when a model, prompt or tool changes underneath you, plus the review cadence that keeps controls current as agents gain capability. Agent assurance is not a point-in-time exercise.

OutputsRegression Eval Suite · Observability Dashboard · Quarterly Review · Updated Control Set
Why T3

Independent Advice. Engineering Depth.

T3 sits where policy meets engineering. We are not an agent platform vendor, and we hold no commercial relationships with the model providers whose systems we test.

We Helped Write the Standards

Contributions to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001 and NIST AI RMF. When an obligation is ambiguous, we know what it was drafted to achieve.

We Build the Control Plane, Not a Policy PDF

Where off-the-shelf GRC platforms stop, we build the deterministic guardrails, trace instrumentation and eval harnesses that sit in your execution path, fitted to your stack, your models and your regulator.

Regulated Sector Experience

Direct delivery in financial services, healthcare and the public sector, with the regulatory literacy to navigate FCA, MHRA and EU AI Act requirements in practice.

Financial Services Healthcare Public Sector Enterprise Tech
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Ready to Prove Your Agents Are Under Control?

Book a no-obligation Discovery Call with a T3 agent assurance specialist. In 45 minutes we will map where your agents are running, identify your highest-consequence exposures, and outline a realistic path forward, specific to your organisation, sector and regulatory obligations.

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No obligation. No sales pitch. A structured conversation with a qualified consultant. Typically responds within one business day.

  • Which agents are live in your environment, including ones adopted without approval
  • What those agents can reach, and under whose permissions
  • Where your current oversight breaks down at machine speed
  • Your regulatory obligations for autonomous systems, by sector
  • A realistic engagement scope and timeline
Frequently asked questions

AI Agent Assurance

Model testing asks whether the output is accurate, fair and safe. Agent assurance asks what the system is permitted to do with that output, whether those permissions hold under attack, and whether the resulting actions can be reconstructed afterwards.
The platform provides capability. The permission model, the approval thresholds and the audit trail sit with you, and so does the regulatory obligation. Vendor assurance covers their controls, not your configuration of them.
Testing is normally conducted in a mirrored non-production environment with equivalent permissions. Where production testing is genuinely necessary, it is scoped, time-boxed and agreed with your risk function in advance.
No. Instructions in a system prompt are a request to a probabilistic system, and anything that can be persuaded can be persuaded by an attacker. Behavioural constraints belong in deterministic code at the tool boundary, with the prompt as a second layer rather than the only one.
It widens the graph. Every connected server is another set of tools the agent can reach, often with permissions inherited from whoever authorised the connection. The inventory and least agency work in Phase 01 and 02 covers MCP explicitly.
Obligations depend on the risk classification of the system and its use case, with human oversight, logging and transparency requirements applying to high-risk applications. We assess classification as part of Phase 01 rather than assuming it.